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This paper outlines the fundamental aspects of a Heideggerian-
ecofeminist philosophy. It aims to be suggestive rather than definitive 
regarding the form and function of such a philosophy and will, 
consequently, be somewhat partial and incomplete. It is intended to 
highlight the enormous potential of such a hybrid philosophy. To this 
end it will provide a brief account of the philosophy of the later 
Heidegger, with particular emphasis on his analysis of technology and 
his account of the Greek concept of truth as aletheia, or unconcealment. 
It will also focus on Heidegger’s account of the connection between the 
Greek concept of nature as physis and his own ontology of Being, 
“letting-be” as the appropriate attitudinal stance to existence, and the 
bearing of all the above on contemporary ecological concerns. 
 
A major problem that faces any attempt to construct a Heideggerian-
ecofeminism concerns Heidegger’s reticence regarding gender issues, 
which stem from his view that Dasein, human beings, are ontologically 
prior to any sexual difference. This article acknowledges the lacuna in 
Heidegger’s thought regarding gender, but argues that one can educe a 
coherent and credible account of gender difference and oppression from 
Heidegger’s later philosophy without distortion. 
Gregory Morgan Swer acquired his Master of Arts degree from the Division of 
History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Leeds. He has 
published previously on the philosophy of Lewis Mumford and the later 
Heidegger. Swer’s research centres on the intersections between the 
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The later Heidegger, as he develops his critique of technological 
modernity, moves beyond the position put forward in Being and Time. 
In light of his later account of the Gestell, the Enframing, we can see 
why this was the case. Being and Time, to use the later Heidegger’s 
terminology, is an “enframed” work. It is an account of the fundamental 
categories of existence as perceived from within the Enframing and, as 
such, its account of Dasein and its relation to Being is necessarily 
skewed. However, Being and Time can still be of considerable use if it 
is read against itself, in light of later Heideggerian philosophy, as an 
enframed work. And it is the key contention of this paper that when we 
do so, such a re-reading leads us to a Heideggerian account of gender. 
In other words, by retrospectively applying later Heidegger to Being 
and Time, we arrive at a new understanding of its key concepts, such as 
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. These in turn lead us to a 
Heideggerian account of gender and nature and their intrinsic inter-
connection that both captures and accords with key ecofeminist 
insights.1 To be more specific, we arrive at an ontologically grounded 
theory that can be used to provide an account of patriarchy in terms of 
Dasein’s ontological homelessness and which in turn points the way to 
a more positive relationship towards Being and physis/nature. In an 
attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of Heidegger-based 
ecofeminism with pre-exisiting forms of ecofeminist philosophy, this 
paper will refer throughout to other ecofeminist philosophers, in 
particular Susan Griffin and Vandana Shiva. This is not to suggest that 
these two philosophers are in any way representative of the entirety of 
ecofeminist philosophy. Rather, this paper holds that Griffin and Shiva 
are especially useful for elucidating the numerous resonances between 
ecofeminist philosophy and the philosophy of the later Heidegger. They 
are also both exemplars of the form of anti-dualist ecofeminist 
philosophy that this paper endorses.2
For all the efforts that have been made to articulate an ecofeminist 
philosophy, most attempts tend to draw on existing social relations and 




Why Does Ecofeminism Need Heidegger? 
  
3 In addition, 
they tend to be focused on particular issues, such as in vitro fertilization 
treatment or new biotechnologies, or else are more concerned with 
providing general critiques of the modern world, than with attempting to 
construct fully developed alternative worldviews to put in its place.4 
Much ecofeminist theory directs the focus of its ire on capitalist-
The Trumpeter 104 
patriarchal metaphysics, critiquing it for forcing an untrue picture of 
reality onto nature, the sole purpose of which is to justify its continued 
exploitation by the capitalist-patriarchal elite of the Western world. 
Insofar as ecofeminists look for a historico-philosophical root of this 
metaphysical malaise they tend, as Trish Glazebrook observes, towards 
one of two positions.  
The first position identifies Greek philosophy, in particular its value 
dualisms, as the ideological source of the oppression of both women and 
nature. (Glazebrook cites Rosemary Ruether and Susan Griffin as 
adherents to this view.)5 The second position identifies modern science, 
particularly as articulated by Descartes and Bacon, as the origin of the 
logic of domination that permeates western rationality. (Glazebrook cites 
Vandana Shiva and Carolyn Merchant as proponents of this view.)6 
Heidegger, Glazebrook argues, can accommodate both these 
perspectives without contradiction.7 His philosophy is able to reconcile 
the theory of Greek origins with that of the modern science origins by 
locating the genesis and development of modern science in classical 
Greek thought. To be more specific, in the philosophy of Aristotle.  
Aristotle, he argues, by understanding nature as consisting of two 
principles, matter and form, led to the belief that an entity was no more 
than formed matter: that is to say, passive matter upon which a form has 
been impressed. This, combined with the subjectivism ushered in by 
Descartes, leads to the present view of nature as resource.  
Up to Descartes’s time, and even later, man was conceived as the animal 
rationale, as a rational living being. With this particular emphasis on the I, 
that is, with the “I think”, the determination of the rational and of reason now 
takes on a distinct priority. For thinking is the fundamental act of reason. With 
the cogito – sum, reason now becomes explicitly posited as the first ground of 
all knowledge and the guideline of the determination of the things.8  
This is the “grounding moment” of modern science for Heidegger.9 
Henceforth science can impose its preconception of an object onto the 
unyielding and plastic matter of the world. The will now imposes 
form.10
However, this overlap between ecofeminist theory and Heideggerian 
philosophy, though convenient, does not by itself create a compelling case for 
attempting to use the latter to ground a philosophical understanding of the 
former. Perhaps the question of what use Heidegger can be in developing an 
ecofeminist philosophy is best approached negatively. In other words, what 
reasons might there be, from an ecofeminist perspective, for rejecting the 
philosophy of the later Heidegger? The first, most obvious reason stems from 
the fact that Heidegger’s politics were, at one point in his life, somewhat 
extreme. However distasteful Heidegger’s politics during his dalliance with 
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Nazism may be to us, I would argue there are no convincing reasons to believe 
that his later philosophy in any way propagates this political ideology.11 A 
second reason for rejecting Heidegger might be that his later philosophy is too 
opaque, vague, or theoretical to generate the kind of practical political action 
that ecofeminism exists to promote. Whilst one might have some sympathy 
with this position, it should be noted that ecofeminism has its origins in 
political activism.12 Thus the motivation to put one’s ecofeminist beliefs into 
practice already exists. It is rather the philosophical underpinnings and 
justification of such actions that are lacking, and it is these that Heideggerian 
philosophy can provide. A third, more significant objection, might be that 
Heidegger addresses neither gender nor ecology in his philosophy. Given that 
these two areas are the raison d’etre of ecofeminist theory, this does pose 
something of a problem. Having said that, though, the absence of gender-nature 
analysis in Heideggerian philosophy does not mean that one cannot make use 
of this philosophy in framing such an analysis. Indeed, it is central to my 
argument that one can indeed derive such an analysis from the later Heidegger 
in such a way that not only grounds ecofeminist theory but deepens its 
understanding. A theory of gender and nature may not be explicit within 
Heideggerian philosophy, but it can be constructed from it without doing 
violence to Heidegger’s own positions.13 
 
Heidegger on the Essence of Technology  
It is not immediately obvious how Heidegger’s writings have much bearing on 
the subject matter usually attended to by ecofeminist philosophers. However it 
will be argued here that Heidegger’s views on science and technology bear 
considerable similarities with the analyses of science and technology put 
forward by ecofeminists. Furthermore, it will be argued that Heidegger’s 
insights into the nature of science and technology can be used to extend and 
clarify ecofeminist views on these matters. Heidegger can be used to provide a 
more coherent and wide-ranging account of science and technology which, 
whilst it is not always immediately similar to pre-existing ecofeminist 
viewpoints, is highly compatible with the ecofeminist outlook.14
Heidegger’s account of science and technology cannot be addressed without 
first reaching an understanding of his concept of Being. For Heidegger, the key 
to truly understanding technology is not to study technologies themselves, the 
artefactual instances of modern technology, but to reflect on the essence of 
technology. The essence of modern technology, according to Heidegger, is not 
itself technological and thus is not to be found in the artefacts of technology, 
nor in their effects.
 
15 To understand technology we must, to use Heidegger’s 
vocabulary, consider it not at the ontic level, the level of individual 
appearances, but at the ontological level, that which underlies the ontic.16 
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Though part of the destiny of Western civilization, Heidegger views the 
essence of technology as outside of human control, and a potential threat to 
both humanity and nature.17 
Before one can begin to unravel exactly what Heidegger believed the essence 
of technology to be, one must first understand his position on truth, nature, and 
the character of technological activity. Key to Heidegger’s perspective on 
technology is the concept of truth, a concept that he feels is most fully 
comprehended with reference to the Greek understanding of the word 
aletheia—revealing or unconcealment.18 The manifestation of any phenomena, 
be it naturally or through craft, is a revealing. In bringing itself forth, or 
through being brought forth, phenomena reveals itself. Aletheia is therefore the 
area in which things reveal their truth. Techne, the use of crafts to bring 
something forth into human awareness that was not previously present, is 
thereby a mode of aletheia. In the bringing forth of techne something is brought 
out of concealment and into revealing, the realm of aletheia.19 
A further level of meaning arising from understanding aletheia as truth is that, 
due to the nature of aletheia, every claim to absolute truth is an untruth. Truth, 
for Heidegger, is not a static but a dynamic concept. Rejecting the assumption 
that to provide a description of a thing that we deem “true” is to provide an 
account that represents a complete description of a phenomenon of fixed 
qualities, Heidegger argues instead that to bring something into aletheia is not 
the end of the process of revealing. As we bring a thing out of concealment into 
unconcealment, we simultaneously conceal that thing. To focus on revealing 
certain aspects of a thing is to turn away from other aspects.20
Modern technology is also a mode of aletheia. It, like traditional techne, 
induces the manifestation of phenomena that were not already apparent. The 
key difference between the modern and historic activities lies in the nature of 
the inducement. Techne’s mode of revealing is a bringing-forth into 
unconcealment of that which was concealed. Modern technology, in contrast, is 
a challenging-forth. It is to demand of nature that it yield up energy in a way 
which may be stored, transmitted, and utilized.
 Thus, within 
whatever truths we deem to have been revealed there always remain those 
which are unrevealed. Thus the truth of a thing is always a shifting, only 
partially understood matter. 
21 Rather than induce nature to 
bring into appearance that which lay within it, but in concealment, modern 
technology orders that nature reveal its truths in a way that is amenable to 
human exploitation, that is, in a manner that conforms to that which suits the 
Gestell, the technological framework imposed upon nature. A thing becomes 
reduced to no more than its utility-potential.22 Phenomena are still revealed but 
are only permitted to manifest themselves in “expedient” ways, rather than as 
they would.23 They are transformed.24 It is for this reason that Heidegger views 
modern technology’s mode of revealing as a challenging-forth, a setting-upon.  
 
 
Volume 24, Number 3 107 
It is important to note here that Heidegger is not suggesting that the phenomena 
of nature that modern technology reveals and utilizes are, in any ontological 
sense, fabricated. “Man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in 
which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws.”25 The truths of 
nature provided by science and technology are “genuine” truths. Their falsity 
lies in their claim to represent the totality of the truth of natural phenomena.26 
As discussed above, to bring one aspect of a phenomenon into truth is to 
conceal other aspects. Modern technology’s nature of revealing means that 
phenomena only manifest themselves within the Gestell as Bestand, standing 
reserves.27 Their other qualities remain in concealment. And it is with this 
perception of the world, through the technological framework as Bestand, that 
Heidegger locates the real danger of modern technology. 
Techne, Physis, and the Ethics of Care  
Heidegger, as shown above, identifies the essence of technology as the 
Gestell, the “setting-upon that challenges.” Nature/reality is forced to 
reveal itself as the standing reserve, a resource well.  
Everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand 
there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering . . . Whatever stands 
by us in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as 
object.28 
The ethos of the modern era is a form of radical nihilistic subjectivism. 
Man believes that he wills the world to be as it is, yet he too stands 
within the Enframing. He too is ordered to stand by, to be immediately 
on hand. Heidegger asks the question, “does not man himself belong 
even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?” He 
answers, “precisely because man is challenged more originally than are 
the energies of nature, he is never transformed into mere standing-
reserve.”29 The important word here is “mere.” Man is himself ordered 
but, as we shall see, never completely.30
This understanding of Being differs radically from that of the Ancient 
Greeks, on Heidegger’s account. In brief, the Greeks understood truth 
as aletheia, as the unconcealment that simultaneously conceals. 
Technology, for the Greeks, was a bringing-forth, poesis, rather than a 
challenging-forth. Poesis, bringing- forth, is defined as that which lets 
“what is not yet present arrive into presencing.”
 
31 Heidegger identifies 
two types of poesis. The first, physis, is a bringing-forth that is 
unassisted. “What presences by means of physis has the irruption 
belonging to bringing-forth . . . in itself.”32 Heidegger gives the 
example of a blossom coming into bloom. The second type of poesis, 
techne, is a bringing-forth in which the irruption that occurs 
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spontaneously in nature is assisted by the craftsman or artist. “What is 
brought forth by the artisan or the artist . . . has the irruption belonging 
to bringing-forth, not in itself, but in another.”33 
Poiesis, as Julian Young points out, also has a broader meaning. At the 
level of the specific, such as the example of the blossom coming into 
bloom, it is an event that takes place within nature. “At its most 
fundamental level, however, poiesis is the blossoming forth of 
nature.”34  It is the irruption into existence of the natural world. “Being 
as a whole reveals itself as physis, ‘nature,’ which here does not . . . 
mean a particular sphere of beings but rather beings as a whole, 
specifically in the sense of upsurgent presence.”35 The presencing of the 
world, unlike the blooming of the blossom, is not visible and being of 
such greater scale, and was perceived as being tremendous and awe-
inspiring. “The Greeks, then, experienced their world as brought into, 
and sustained in (B)eing by an overwhelmingly powerful, utterly 
mysterious force . . . It was, in short, a numinous world, a holy, a sacred 
place.”36 The Greeks thus saw the presencing of the world as a divine 
process, and it is this fact that, according to Heidegger, explains the 
Greeks’ different relations to technology.37 
Given that the world itself is perceived as being a divine place, a 
constant gift from the gods, it follows that one’s attitude to the world 
and its contents will reflect this perception. Viewing the world as a 
place worthy of respect and conservation, the Greeks acted accordingly. 
This is not to say that they wrought no changes in the natural world, but 
that all such transformative actions were bounded by considerations of 
appropriate respect and conservation. Hence the emphasis on “bringing-
forth” as opposed to “setting-upon” as the dominant mode of 
production. Hence also the classification of human productive activities 
within the same sphere as natural processes of growth and emergence. 
Rather than imposing a form upon nature, the Greek craftsman “lets” 
what is already immanent but concealed in the materials come forth 
from concealment into presence. Productive activity is a respectful 
assistance to nature, rather than an imposition of will. It is a matter of 
letting the divine origin of things complete its self-disclosure through 
one’s own creative activity. Thus, the essence of Greek technology, the 
underlying ground for its mode of world-disclosure, is the perception of 
the world as divine. This is why their technology was gentle and caring, 
as opposed to violent in the fashion of modern technology, whose 
essence is the Enframing.38
It has been noticed that, in contrast with Heidegger’s description of 
man’s relationship with nature in the Gestell, in terms of “setting-
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far more feminine.39  What Heidegger advocates with his letting-be is a 
way of being with entities that explicitly rejects the violence of the 
Gestell, and its will to order, or impose order. Heidegger redefines 
Dasein as “the shepherd of Being.”40 His philosophy offers, against the 
Gestell, an ethic of stewardship and care. When one dwells upon the 
earth, “the homeland is experienced as caring for and protecting the 
dweller who, in return, cares and protects, conserves it.”41 It is a 
commitment to maintenance, and a rejection of the will-to-order. 
Summarizing this position, Huntington states,  
Human being cannot prevail over the age of the Gestell by will, but must 
rather twist free of the historical consequences of Western metaphysics by 
recovering the capacity to embrace the intrinsic beauty housed in the 
singularity of each and every other being.42 
It is here, in Heidegger’s account of dwelling and Dasein as custodian 
that we see the potential of his philosophy for underpinning and 
elaborating ecofeminist insight into the ecological problems of the 
modern world. The notion of reciprocal care between Dasein and nature 
goes to the heart of ecofeminist visions of appropriate existence. 
Among several ecofeminist attempts to expound an ecofeminist ethical 
system, one noteworthy attempt can be found in the introduction to 
Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva’s Ecofeminism.43 Here they advocate a 
type of partial relativism. One is not to sit in judgment on the conduct 
of those in other cultures, nor interfere in their affairs, unless one is 
compelled to do so. The only situations that merit external judgment or 
interference are those, to put it in Heideggerian terms, in which 
violence is being done. This ethics of letting-be, and its rejection of 
violent setting-upon, is entirely Heideggerian in tone. In short, 
ecofeminism and Heidegger share a similar critique of the origins of 
technological modernity and a common ethos in their vision of 
appropriate existence.44
Michael Zimmerman contends that Heidegger’s philosophy cannot be 
made to serve the purposes of an ecofeminist philosophy. Zimmerman 
argues that Heidegger’s ontological account of Western history 
conceals and marginalizes the issue of sexual difference in favour of his 
own focus on ontological difference. Feminists, by contrast, do not seek 
the origins of modern technology in Greek philosophy or the history of 
Being, but in historically specific socio-cultural forces. Focus on the 
 The question remains, however, whether 
Heidegger can accommodate ecofeminism’s focus on gender and 
nature, and the systems of oppression of capitalism and patriarchy. 
 
Zimmerman’s Objection and the Forgetting of Women   
The Trumpeter 110 
sexual difference, rather than the ontological, enables them to locate an 
alternative source for the logic of domination that characterizes 
technological modernity. Namely, “the patriarchal domination of 
woman, body, and nature.”45 So, while agreeing with Heidegger that 
the west is governed by an aggressive drive for total control, they argue 
that this arose for gender-related factors, rather than ontological ones. 
Zimmerman argues that Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein in 
ontological terms, and thereby gender-neutral terms, results in him 
relegating issues of sexual difference to matters of metaphysics. 
Zimmerman also argues that Heidegger’s hoped-for new epoch of 
Being will not bring about the acceptance of difference and Otherness. 
Rather, Heidegger’s account of the turn in Being, according to 
Zimmerman (following Bernstein), effectively totalizes the event of 
Being.46 The new clearing that will follow the demise of the Gestell 
will be as monolithic as its predecessor. Heidegger advocates an 
enforced homogeneity, albeit one in which Dasein stands in an open 
and positive relation to Being, rather than the celebration of plurality 
and diversity. World-disclosure, for Zimmerman, is a cultural 
paradigm. Heidegger’s turn in Being has a one-size-fits-all character. It 
allows one view from the clearing of Being, rather than enabling a 
multiplicity of overlapping local worlds.47
Heidegger argues that Dasein is claimed by Being in such a way that it 
opens up a site in which Being can manifest itself. Technological 
modernity operates with a limited notion of this, and only permits 
Being to presence in the uni-dimensionality of the resource. If we 
interpret ecofeminist accounts of women’s actions in the maintenance 
and propagation of life in Heideggerian terms, then we can say that the 
Dasein of women creates and holds open a clearing in which the Being 
 
In summary then, if it is to be of use in grounding an ecofeminist 
philosophy, it must be shown that the philosophy of the later Heidegger 
can perform certain functions. It must be able to explain the connection 
between women and nature. It must be able to account for patriarchy 
and capitalism and the connection between them and the oppression of 
women and nature. Furthermore, it must be shown that Heidegger can 
accommodate plurality and difference. These are the necessary 
conditions that must be met for any putative Heideggerian-ecofeminism 
to be considered as such. Let us turn then to the first condition, an 
account of women and nature. 
 
Women, Nature, and Being  
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of beings can presence itself in a non-violent way. In other words, a 
way that is not a setting-upon or a challenging-forth. We may consider 
three basic examples of the ways in which the Dasein of women can 
disclose its ek-static nature, its standing out into the truth of Being. 
First, this nature is apparent in what Ariel Salleh calls women’s 
“holding” activities. The term holding describes the way in which 
women, within the household or locality, attempt to minimize conflict, 
sustain children in safety, maintain the interconnectedness of a family, 
and so on. Salleh states that, “holding practice is the quintessential work 
of resisting entropy.”48 Through holding, the activities that sustain 
human life and community, women maintain a site where Being can be, 
ontically. For Being to presence, there must be Dasein to hold open the 
clearing. By sustaining  (social) life, women maintain the ontic 
conditions necessary for this to occur. 
Second, women can be connected to Being through reproduction. By 
bearing children and nurturing them, women are clearly connected to 
Being in the manner just considered.49 However, on another level, 
women, by bringing forth life within themselves, are connected to 
Being through poesis. In bringing a child to term, women are connected 
poetically to Being as physis. A mother, like the peasant who sows the 
field, places life “in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches 
over its increase.”50 As with the Greeks, she both enables and bears 
witness to the “upsurgent presencing” of nature.51 In this way, she has 
insight into and connection with other modes of physis, such as are 
present in the cycles of the natural world.52  
Third, in those parts of the world where agriculture is still the main 
form of industry, women often play an invisible role. They perform a 
range of activities that are necessary for the continued well-being of 
both the family and the land upon which they depend. Because this 
labour is not “productive” in the sense that it does not generate surplus 
value, it is often ignored, despite the fact that it is necessary for the 
maintenance of the conditions of existence which in turn enable humans 
to engage in those activities that are deemed to be productive by the 
rationale of the Gestell. In gathering wood, or planting and sowing, 
women come to bear immediate witness to the constant processes of 
physis and to an awareness of their dependency upon them. In short, 
they come to an appreciation of physis and respect it as sacred. Thus, 
when ecofeminists speak of Nature as a model for human activity or a 
source of ethical norms, on the Heideggerian-ecofeminist account put 
forward in this paper, it is to be understood that they are in fact 
speaking of Being, albeit Being as understood in its presencing as 
physis.53 Thus women stand in proximity to Being through physis.54 
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At this point one may well ask how it is that women stand in this 
proximity. Is woman’s connection to physis by virtue of her bodily 
existence, or is it a socialized awareness? To ask the question in this 
way threatens to return us to the hoary feminist debates of essentialism 
versus socialization. Understood ontically, Dasein is neither. Dasein, in 
its nature, is a being-in-the-world. That is to say, it is embodied. For 
Dasein, mind and body are one. It is an embodied mind and a minded 
body.55 Ontologically, by virtue of its ek-static nature, Dasein always 
stands out into the truth of Being whether Dasein is aware of this fact or 
not. Thus, whether Dasein is “socialized” or “biologized” into an 
awareness of its relation to Being is of secondary relevance, given the 
primary fact that this relation is ontologically prior. In this way a 
Heideggerian-ecofeminist account of women’s connection to Being 
avoids the charge of recreating value dualisms caused by enshrining 
women’s perspectives as a positive over the negative of the male 
outlook, in reverse of their normal standing. Rather, women’s 
standpoint is given due respect, but it is not held to be superior simply 
by virtue of it belonging to a woman. Rather its superiority to the 
standard masculine view is held to be the fact that women are aware of 
their fundamental connection to Being, while men are not. The key 
point here is that men and women, by virtue of their ek-static nature, 
both have this connection to Being. Men, however, suffer from the 
Oblivion of Being.56
However well a Heideggerian account of the ontological character of 
women affirms and underpins cherished ecofeminist conceptions of 
women’s connection to and place within Nature, the question still 
remains concerning the apparent absence of patriarchy and capitalism in 
Heidegger’s account of the Enframing (Gestell). Or, to be more 
specific, how can Heidegger, if at all, account for the way in which 
women are marginalized and mistreated under the capitalist-patriarchal 
system that, for most ecofeminist theories, characterizes modernity? 
The obvious answer would be to argue that under the Gestell both 
humanity and entities are viewed as pure resource, and thus treated as 
such, rather than as beings-in-themselves. The exploitation of women, 
consequently, stems from their location within the standing-reserve of 
the Enframing. And in turn their liberation and appreciation as beings in 
their own right depends upon humanity’s ability to overcome the 
Enframing and open themselves to a new turning in Being. However 
the problem with this response is its gender neutrality. From 
  
 
The Enframing and Alterity 
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Heidegger’s account of the Enframing, one gets the impression of a sort 
of “homogeneity” of oppression. Modernity’s logic of domination treats 
all as resources regardless, one is led to conclude, of race, creed, and 
most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, gender. Within the 
Gestell, e pluribus unum. Such a view would run contrary to the tenets 
of ecofeminist philosophy given that it is founded on the belief that 
while all are, to an extent, oppressed within modernity, not all are 
oppressed equally. Furthermore, Heidegger’s account of the effects of 
the Enframing signally fails to link the oppression of women and the 
oppression of nature. Consequently, from an ecofeminist perspective, 
Heidegger’s analysis of modernity’s system of oppression and 
exploitation is, whilst generally sound, far too general and insufficiently 
gender-specific to provide a truly accurate account. However, I believe 
that Heidegger’s account of the Gestell can yield a sufficiently gender-
sensitive approach. To do so, however, it must be modified from the 
version provided in the Question concerning technology. And, to do 
this, we must return to the account of technology given in Being and 
Time. More specifically, we must return to the famous example of the 
hammer. 
First, a word or two by way of explanation. This sudden turn towards 
the contents of Being and Time might well appear somewhat odd given 
that this article has thus far declared itself to be solely interested in the 
philosophy of the later Heidegger, that is to say, the philosophy that he 
produced after his famous “turn” in the 1930s. Being and Time is most 
definitely a pre-Kehre work and, therefore, should be, on the face of it, 
excluded from this thesis. To use the philosophy of Heidegger found in 
Being and Time to elucidate aspects of his account of the Enframing 
would appear to require the assertion that there is some sort of 
continuity of approach between early and late Heideggerian philosophy. 
This, once again, being an interpretation that this paper has most 
explicitly ruled out. Heidegger’s pre-Kehre philosophy has been 
excluded thus far because Heidegger does not begin to seriously 
address the question of Being as a topic in its own right before his 
“turn.” Prior to this point, and particularly in Being and Time, Dasein 
still has prominence. Being, as it were, exists for Dasein, rather than 
vice-versa as in the post-Kehre work. In this respect, to use the 
terminology of the later Heidegger retrospectively, Being and Time is a 
profoundly modernist work. That is to say, it is contained within the 
worldview of the Enframing. In this work Heidegger analyses the 
ontological categories of human existence within a conceptual scheme 
skewed by the Gestell. And it is this fact that gives it its present utility 
with regards to the issue of gender-sensitivity.  
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In Being and Time Heidegger discusses the ways in which the Being of 
beings manifests itself to Dasein. Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world is 
such that objects do not appear to Dasein as objects in themselves. 
Rather they appear from a perspective of instrumental utility. Dasein 
experiences them as tools, actual or potential, which it can employ in 
the pursuit of its objectives, whatever they may be. As Heidegger puts 
it, they reveal themselves as “equipment.” He states, 
Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure 
(hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of 
this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the 
equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does 
not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but 
it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more 
suitable. In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern 
subordinates itself to the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the 
equipment we are employing at the time; the less we stare at the hammer-
Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does 
our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as 
that which it is—as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific 
“manipulability” of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment 
possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call “readiness-
to-hand.”57  
In other words, the primary mode of world-disclosure is that in which 
the world is revealed as an equipmental totality, or as Heidegger will 
later characterize it, as standing-reserve. The hammer never appears as 
a Thing, that is, as a being-in-itself, but rather as a being-in-order-to. 
The “in-order-to” here refers to the intentions of its users rather than 
any inherent tendency within the entity itself. Thus the being-in-order-
to is better understood as a being-for-us. That is to say, it stands before 
us as pure resource, eminently suited to being manipulated to human 
(male) ends.58 
In addition to, and derivative from, the disclosure of beings as ready-to 
hand, beings can also be disclosed as “Things”, that is to say, as objects. 
In this mode of world-disclosure, beings appear as present-at-hand. 
Rather than being an invisible component of an underlying equipmental 
totality, as present-at-hand, an entity reveals itself in a non-purely 
instrumental manner. In doing so it detaches itself from its near 
invisible place in the work-world and stands before us as an object of 
contemplation, something that may be considered in (hypothetical) 
isolation. It is this kind of disclosure of beings that Heidegger takes to 
be typical of the physical sciences.59
If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the 
present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our 
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any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is 
now the sole remaining mode of Being-in (the world), the mode of just 
tarrying alongside . . . This kind of Being towards the world is one which lets 
us encounter entities within-the-world purely in the way they look, just that 
on the basis of this kind of Being, and as a mode of it, looking explicitly at 
what we encounter is possible . . . such looking-at enters the mode of 
dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world. In this kind of 
“dwelling” as a holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, 
the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated.60  
Heidegger here clearly views the enframed view of entities as standing 
reserve to be the originary, and foundational, mode of Being.61 To view 
entities as individuals in their own right, with their own characteristics, 
is to step back from the primary instrumental mode of Being-in-the-
world. Regardless of its ontologically derivative status, this division 
between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is of key importance in 
understanding the status of women within technological modernity. 
On the one hand, we have entities viewed as ready-to-hand, that is to 
say, that appear to us as pure resource (Bestand). On the other hand (in 
Being and Time) we have entities understood as present-at-hand, that is, 
as objects. At first glance, it may seem as if these categories apply only 
to non-human beings.62 Ready-to-hand and present-at-hand would seem 
to be descriptions of either pieces of equipment, like the hammer, or 
materials, that upon which the equipment operates, or that which is 
taken up in the construction of the equipment (wood and metal, in the 
case of the hammer) and vanishes into it the more it is used. However, 
given that we are re-reading Being and Time in the light of Heidegger’s 
later philosophy, we may interpret these categories as applying to 
human as well as non-human entities. In “The Question concerning 
Technology” Heidegger states that, “Only to the extent that man for his 
part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this 
revealing that orders happen.” He then asks, “If man is challenged, 
ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more 
originally than nature within the standing-reserve?”63 Heidegger’s 
answer is most significant for the purposes of this discussion. He 
replies, “precisely because man is challenged more originally than are 
the energies of nature, he is never transformed into mere standing 
reserve.”64
Heidegger’s response that humanity, by providing the site in which 
being can bring itself to presencing, stands out at all times into the 
presence of being, should be familiar to us. What is of novel import 
here is Heidegger’s precise phrasing of the answer to his own question 
of whether humanity is itself transformed into pure resource with the 
Enframing. His reply is that humanity is never transformed into “mere 
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standing-reserve.” In other words, humanity is revealed as resource just 
as non-human objects are, just as “the wood is a forest of timber, the 
mountain a quarry of rock.”65 The difference being that humans never 
vanish completely into the standing-reserve, in the way that a non-
human object does, given Dasein’s special relationship with the 
presencing of Being. Dasein is always the site of Being’s self-
disclosure, whether humanity recalls this fact or forgets it. In this way, 
and in this way only, does humanity differ from other entities within the 
Gestell. And if Heidegger’s call for us to rediscover our powers and 
responsibilities as world-disclosers fails, and humanity utterly forgets 
its ek-static nature, then, in practice, there would be little to distinguish, 
at an ontic level, between human and non-human.  
So, to return to the question of the entities included in Heidegger’s early 
categories of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, it would appear that it 
applies to both humans and non-humans alike. Thus humans, within the 
Enframing, will appear as either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. The 
relevance of this to the status of women in modernity is as follows. 
Men, particularly the working classes, on a Heideggerian account have 
come to be ready-to-hand. Within modernity’s productionist 
metaphysics, they function as productive units. This is both their 
destining and what gives them their status and purpose.66 From this 
view, the history of labour-relations and class struggle is the record of 
gradual transformation of male workers into more or less efficient (i.e., 
productive) components of the standing reserve. The more effective 
they are, the less visible within the technological system they become. 
In the same way that the stone and wood that make up a bridge vanish 
into its functioning totality the more they fulfill their role, so too do the 
individual workers vanish into the totality of technological 
production.67 Women, as feminists often point out, initially laboured 
under the Engelian notion that their admittance into the field of 
productive labour would usher in an era in which they would share 
equal status with their male counterparts. The reality has been 
somewhat different. In many cases women are excluded from areas 
recognized as being productive labour. Their own labour, outside the 
standard conceptions of the modern work-world, is devalued or 
ignored.68 Where women are admitted into the work-world, they are 
rarely completely accepted and assimilated. In Heideggerian terms, 
women tend to appear as present-at-hand.69
Let us return now to Heidegger’s earlier argument concerning the 
nihilism of the technological age, the rise to ascendancy of the “will to 
will.” For an entity to appear as present-at-hand, that is to say, as an 
object, one requires the presence of Dasein, a willing subject, that 
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When man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own 
conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that 
challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the 
object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.70 
Man, ordered himself by the Gestell into a part of the standing-reserve, 
at the same time imposed his will to order onto nature. In extending the 
Enframing, man transforms himself ever more into the “objectlessness” 
of pure resource, whilst at the same time reaffirming his nature as a 
willing subject, the being-that-wills-the-world. Man enframes, and is 
thus himself enframed. Woman, on the other hand, is somewhat 
different. Where “fortunate” enough to be assimilated into the work-
world, she approximates to the status of pure resource. She is ready-to-
hand. Where she cannot, or will not, merge into the equipmental 
totality, she appears as an object. She is present-at-hand. At no point is 
she ever the subject, the being-that-wills-the-world.71  
There is also a considerable difference between the way a woman 
appears as present-at-hand, an object, and the way in which entities in 
the world appear as present-at-hand in the physical sciences. In the 
latter case, the entity-as-object is an object for contemplation and 
scrutiny, and eventual description in mathematical terms. In the former 
case, that of women, the situation is very different. Consider 
Heidegger’s account in Being and Time of how it is that Dasein (which 
in this case we can understand as referring to men) comes to consider 
an entity, such as hammer, as being present-at-hand rather than ready-
to-hand.  
When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most 
closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly 
adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, 
or the material unsuitable . . . When its unusability is discovered, equipment 
becomes conspicuous.72
When we notice what is un-ready-to-hand . . . it reveals itself as something 
just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing 
that is missing . . . In our dealings with the world of our concern, the un-
ready-to-hand can be encountered not only in the sense of that which is 
unusable or simply missing, but as something un-ready-to-hand which is not 
missing at all and not unusable, but which “stands in the way” of our 
concern.
 
Women, I will suggest, are viewed within modernity, and its 
capitalistic-patriarchal value system, as being “unsuitable material” for 
productive labour, and thereby for becoming pure resource, let alone a 
willing subject. The term “present-at-hand,” when taken in its social 
rather than scientific context, is a term of denigration.  
Heidegger continues,  
73 
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In other words, that which cannot be assimilated into the equipmental 
totality, can appear not as currently unusable, but as useless.  
The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the 
function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what 
is ready-to-hand. But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just observed and 
stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand that makes itself 
known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Such 
equipment still does not veil itself in the guise of mere Things. It becomes 
“equipment” in the sense of something which one would like to shove out of 
the way.74 
Those excluded (where excluded denotes “not used”) from production 
relations appear as present-at-hand. This means that they appear as 
mere things that have dropped out of the equipmental totality. By not 
conforming, that is, vanishing into the standing-reserve, they reappear 
as objects, opposed to the willing subject, with no use-value.75
Heidegger, as Glazebrook points out, views the Gestell’s logic of 
production as a “logic of domination.”
 
Although no longer a part of the standing reserve, they are still of 
matter to the Gestell for they appear as a hindrance to the will-to-order. 
The question that follows from this account is this: why it is that 
women stand outside the reserve well? The answer, on a Heideggerian 
account, is Being. 
76 Its monolithic interpretation of 
all entities as resources, its absolutization of one productionist horizon 
of disclosure, its totalizing hegemony, and its nihilistic affirmation of 
the will-to-will, are all, on ecofemininist account, attributes of 
patriarchy. The Enframing’s logic of domination is thus a phallo-centric 
logic. “In grounding knowledge on the Cartesian subject” Glazebrook 
argues, it results that, “being is not the underlying substratum upon 
which thought moves, but rather the thinking subject underlies all 
experience and is the absolute fundament on the basis of which things 
receive their thinghood, that is, objectivity.”77 The will is active, and 
the willing subject determines all values. The will imposes itself on 
passive nature, passive matter, and orders it to present itself in 
accordance with productionist metaphysics as standing reserve. The 
active will and productive activity are the two positives of technological 
modernity. That which is not of the will, or stands against it, is passive 
and thereby without intrinsic value. Action that takes place outside the 
rigorously defined categories of “productive” labour, is by definition 
non-productive labour, or simply non-labour, and thereby of little or no 
value. This dichotomy of active versus passive, that which has value 
versus that which does not, corresponds to the value dualisms that 
ecofeminists have identified as perpetuating forms of patriarchal 
oppression.78 Active is male, which has value. Passive is female, which 
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does not. As we have seen, ecofeminists would argue that that which in 
the logic of modernity appears as passive, that is to say women and 
nature, is in fact active in the sense of letting things be. It is activity that 
enables the forces of physis/Being, understood here as Nature, to 
manifest themselves, as opposed to the setting upon that compels nature 
to reveal itself as resource. Thus we find, on a Heideggerian-
ecofeminist account, two competing accounts of truth and praxis here. 
Given their gendered nature, we may classify them as the masculine 
principle (Gestell) and the feminine principle (physis).  
By this point, it may be assumed that we have a fairly comprehensive 
notion of what it is that is referred to by the term, “the Enframing.” Far 
less obvious is what we are to understand by the “feminine principle” of 
which ecofeminists speak. If we were to follow an essentialist 
ecofeminist definition of the “feminine,” given such theories’ 
naturalistic inclinations, one might well arrive at the conclusion that the 
feminine principle denotes a set of distinct and hypothetically definable 
features belonging to women by virtue of their biological nature alone. 
In other words, properties of women exclusively. If, on the other hand, 
we sought an anti-dualistic ecofeminist definition, given that this is the 
form of ecofeminism that this paper has chosen to focus on in the 
construction of a Heideggerian-ecofeminism, then we would arrive at 
the following definition of the feminine. Namely, that the feminine 
principle is all that is excluded by the Enframing. And what is excluded 
includes not just extant properties of beings in the world, but the entire 
potential for novelty in reality.79 Thus the feminine, as the “other” can 
never be exhaustively defined and known. It is a principle rather than a 
property. In short, that which anti-dualistic ecofeminists value and seek 
to restore to consciousness is, on a Heideggerian-ecofeminist account, 
the remembrance of Being itself.80 Thus women appear as the bearers 
of alterity, the excluded “other” of beings not seen within the strictures 
of the Gestell. They carry an awareness of the plentitude of Being 
outside the present clearing.81
Let us turn away for the moment from the feminine principle and 
consider what we have tentatively described as the masculine principle, 
that is, the Enframing. The Enframing is an ontological condition, the 
coming to presence of a particular epoch of Being that was heralded by 
the death of metaphysics. As such, it is not something that is dependent 
on the will of man. Patriarchy and capitalism, on the other hand, are 
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certain historically specific responses to the Enframing. In 
Heideggerian terms, they are metaphysical responses to an ontological 
sending. As the Gestell is spread ever further through the processes of 
globalization, it seems as if the present capitalist-patriarchal character is 
a necessary feature of the Enframing. However, this to forget that the 
present manifestation of the Enframing is a “destining of the West.” 
That is to say that, in its origins at least, the Gestell as capitalist-
patriarchy is culturally specific. Capitalism and patriarchy, on a 
Heideggerian-ecofeminist account, are to be understood as ontic 
structures, specific cultural responses to the ontological condition of the 
Enframing.82  This is best understood as a spirit of technological 
nihilism, a condition in which man totally subjectivizes nature and 
imposes his will upon it. Given the vagaries of societal structures in 
different historical periods, it follows that the Gestell-driven expression 
of the will-to-power, namely the world as resource well, could be 
expressed in different ways. It is thus a historically contingent fact that, 
in the West, its expression was mediated by an elite who had the 
capacity to mobilize technological production to their own ends.83 This 
understanding of the relationship between patriarchy and the Enframing 
underpins ecofeminism’s claim that all forms of oppression (racism, 
patriarchy, capitalism, etc.) are linked. Following Heidegger, all are to 
be understood as ontic responses to the ontological condition of the 
Enframing. However, given the importance of patriarchy for 
ecofeminist critique, let us now consider how the Gestell came to 
manifest itself with its present patriarchal character.84 
We have seen how, within the Enframing, entities are only able to 
reveal themselves in a one-dimensional manner. Himself challenged, as 
he challenges forth the world, man too is revealed primarily as resource. 
Or as Herbert Marcuse puts it, as one-dimensional man.85 Man’s one-
dimensionality within modernity stems from the fact that he defines 
himself purely in terms of his use-value, his productive capacity. As 
Steve Garlick puts it,  
Truth is now thought of in terms of the certainty of representation grounded 
in the autonomous human subject . . . set in place and ordered to exhibit itself 
as part of a projection that Heidegger refers to as the “world picture”, human 
being is hereby given its distinctively modern and paradoxical position as 
potential controller of a system in which it is itself produced.86
In this way, the Gestell not only orders man’s world, it also grounds his 
understanding of what it is to be a man. When beings become 
enframed, their being is regulated and secured according to the 
framework of modern technology. “The concept of masculinity, as a 
product of modern technological thinking, allows men to be 
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can thus be endlessly swapped about.”87 By ordering forth humans in 
gendered terms, it stabilizes the human subject, which in turn grounds 
the world.88 Gender hierarchies, such as patriarchy, provide a means by 
which to stabilize the ground of disclosure by preventing difference 
from undermining order. Thus both economic and social activity were 
framed in a way that was oriented towards the production of order 
itself. 
Modern technology, then, “is a movement towards the absence of 
difference.”89 It is a way to ground the groundlessness of modern 
existence. For, to ground itself, the Gestell must remove all that 
threatens to reveal its claim to world-exclusivity to be empty. Within 
the Gestell, man believes himself to be the ground of all that is, the 
subject-that-wills-the-world. Thus, in his own enframed understanding 
of Being, he constructs a world precariously balanced upon the Abyss 
that threatens it constantly. The nothingness, here understood as 
absence, the void, hedges his projected world about and constantly 
threatens to overtake it and subject both it and him to annihilation, to 
become no-thing. This is the source of the profound ontological 
insecurity, which so characterizes Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s 
existence in Being and Time. As Garlick puts it, “this anxiety over the 
groundlessness of modern existence is self-perpetuating because radical 
ontological insecurity results from revealing the world as merely 
‘standing reserve’.”90 The apparent fragility of productionist 
metaphysics makes man anxious, so he further reinforces the Gestell by 
asserting it more forcefully, over a greater area. But the Abyss still 
threatens.91 Hence his ontological insecurity, which leads him to re-
assert the Gestell, thereby reaffirming his actual being, and in turn 
simultaneously reinforcing the ontological condition that makes him 
insecure. It is a vicious circle.92
It may be objected that Heidegger’s suggestions of new ways of being 
with technology and beings-in-the-world tends to focus overly on the 
ontological rather than the ontic level. Now, one might well allow 
Heidegger his point that the character of the ontic stems from the 
ontological by virtue of the fact that the way beings are in the world 
depends upon the present mode of the presencing of Being, and still 
maintain that the ontic is neglected. For example, it may well be the 
case that technological artefacts are subordinate to the mode of world-
disclosure that dominates in modernity, namely the Enframing. This 
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would follow from Heidegger’s point that the type of technological 
practice that takes place in a culture stems from the way that that 
culture perceives the world and the beings within it. However, this does 
not mean that the technological practice of a culture,  that is to say its 
activity at the ontic level, has no bearing on the ontological level of 
world-disclosure. 
Heidegger’s privileging of the ontological over the ontic overlooks the 
enormous physically transformative powers of modern technology. It is 
not simply the case that the Enframing presents the world as if it were 
nothing but resources, and then technological practice then follows in 
like manner in the treatment of beings. Rather technology now has the 
power to reconfigure beings in the world such that they physically 
rather than conceptually become resources. Heidegger, in his discussion 
of the way minerals are taken up and transformed physically into 
energy, suggests that he is aware of the power of technology to literally 
transform at the ontic level. He states,  
the earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral 
deposit . . . Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set 
upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium . . . 
uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy . . . 93 
However he cannot be diverted from his ontological focus. Given that 
the danger posed by the present environmental crisis is a threat at the 
purely ontic level, though its origins may well lie in an ontological 
mode of disclosure, Heidegger’s unwillingness to engage with 
technology and its transformative powers at the ontic level constitutes a 
significant lacuna in his theory. As Ricard Wolin points out, “were 
Being deprived of the richness and variety proper to organic life, it 
would become faceless and mute, devoid of purpose, ontologically 
impoverished to an extreme.”94
It is at this point that ecofeminism can radically bolster and extend 
Heidegger’s analysis. Ecofeminist writings are replete with examples of 
technologies’ destructive effects on women and the natural world. A 
particularly relevant example of this is given by Shiva in her account of 
the so-called Green Revolution in India. Her analysis of the 
transformation of Indian agriculture with the introduction of western 
biotechnology is most telling. The power of modern technology, on 
Shiva’s account, lies in its abilities to make the metaphysical 
projections of the Gestell actual. Through the intervention of 
technology in nature, the metaphysical horizon of disclosure that 
characterizes the era of the Enframing is imposed on nature and ceases 
to be a conceptual schema. Nature literally becomes as the Gestell 
 In this fashion, the ontological needs 
the ontic.  
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would have it. She writes, “The Green Revolution was based on the 
assumption that technology is a superior substitute for nature, and 
hence a means of producing growth, unconstrained by nature’s 
limits.”95 Nature was set upon to operate in a “productive” mechanistic 
way. “The masculinist breeding strategy of the green revolution was a 
strategy of breeding out the feminine principle by the destruction of the 
self-producing character and genetic diversity of seeds.”96 In other 
words, nature was transformed physically in order to eradicate 
difference. The self-generative powers of nature as physis represent a 
challenge to the technological will that insists that all movement and 
change originate from the willing subject. Entities (seeds) were 
transformed by science in such a way that they could only manifest 
themselves as pure resource.97 However, as Shiva points out, “the 
superimposition of a new order does not necessarily take place perfectly 
and smoothly.”98 The consequence here is that “the soils of India are 
dying.”99
This paper has sketched in rudimentary form the outlines of a 
Heideggerian-ecofeminist philosophy. Such a philosophy can offer an 
analysis of the technological essence of modernity and of the origins 
and operations of capitalist-patriarchy that supports and extends pre-
existing ecofeminist critiques. It holds that capitalism and patriarchy are 
historically specific metaphysical responses to the ontological condition 
of the Enframing, a condition in which the world is set upon to reveal 
itself as pure resource. By re-reading Being and Time in light of the 
later Heidegger’s account of the essence of technology, we can see how 
women appear as present-to-hand in the era of the Gestell. That is to 
say, they stand out against the will of the male subject by failing to 
vanish into the objectlessness of the standing reserve. In this way, they 
appear to the male as a mere object that stands as an obstacle against 
the exercise of their will, to be pushed aside and kept out of view. The 
reason for women’s inability to be harmoniously absorbed into the 
resource-well stems from their awareness of their ontological 
connection to Being as physis/nature, a connection that men have lost 
from awareness. The recovery of this awareness is essential to the 
possibility of a turn in Being, and the ushering in of a new epoch in 
 The destruction of ecological integrity through the 
transformation of agriculture into a more “productive” process has 
resulted in fields where nothing can grow. In other words, man’s ontic 
destruction of nature physically prevents any future mode of Being. 
Where there are no beings, Being cannot presence. 
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which Dasein acts as a shepherd of Being as opposed to struggling for 
mastery. In addition to drawing attention to the ontological roots of the 
modern oppression of women and nature, and the liberatory potential of 
Being, understood here as the feminine principle, a Heideggerian-
ecofeminist philosophy also focuses upon the danger posed at the ontic 
level by the technological transformation of the earth and the damage 
that results. Such a philosophy compels one not only to reflect on the 
ontological structure of oppression, but also to act in defence of 
physis/nature. 
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1 Given the nature of this journal, the article will assume a passing acquaintance with 
ecofeminist theory on the part of the reader. For those seeking to know more, Nancy 
Howell’s “Ecofeminism: What one needs to know” or the chapter on ecofeminism in 
Rosemarie Putnam Tong’s “Feminist thought: A more comprehensive introduction,” 
are as good a place to start as any. 
2 A word or two on what this paper means by “anti-dualist” ecofeminism is clearly in 
order. Anti-dualist ecofeminism is, broadly construed, any ecofeminism that takes the 
position that the primary conceptual position underpinning patriarchal modernity is 
based upon the separation of existence into value-laden dualisms: conceptual dyads 
that are both exclusive and antagonistic. Furthermore, it is the privileging of one part 
of the pair and the denigrating of the other that underlies and perpetuates oppressive 
relations of domination, be it those concerning gender, class or nature. Anti-dualist 
ecofeminism chooses to reject the conceptual schisms involved in dualistic thought 
and the practices they support. In doing so they simultaneously reject essentializing 
analyses of gender that treat terms such as “nature” or “woman” as if they were some 
underlying and unchanging metaphysical quality on the grounds that such analyses, 
however well intentioned, tend to reinforce, rather than expose and undermine, value 
dualisms (e.g., feminist positions that define women as biologically “closer to nature” 
than men). 
3 Francoise d’Eaubonne being a notable exception to this rule (d’Eaubonne 1999). 
4 This is not to suggest that elements of a possible future state are not suggested. 
5 Ruether 1975; Griffin 1978. 
6 Merchant 1980; Shiva 1998. 
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7  Glazebrook 2001, 224. 
8 Heidegger 1993, 304. 
9 Glazebrook 2001: 226. 
10 This view of the will as active and form-giving, and matter as passive and pliable is 
clearly gendered.  
11 The details of the debate over the alleged Nazi over/undertones of Heidegger’s 
philosophy are far too lengthy to go into here. I believe that Heidegger’s philosophy, 
especially his later philosophy which is the main focus of the paper, in no way 
supports or propagates Nazi ideology, although this view is by no means 
uncontentious. The good starting point for information concerning the debate over the 
political character of Heideggerian philosophy is Wolin (1993). For a detailed and 
even-handed account of Heidegger’s political engagement with the forces of fascism, 
see Sluga (1993). 
12 See Sturgeon: 1997. 
13 It is not my intention in this paper to suggest that Heidegger’s later philosophy is 
the one, sole possible philosophical grounding for ecofeminism. I do however incline 
towards the view that much that is central to the works of the later Heidegger is 
implicitly presupposed in the work of many ecofeminist philosophers, although one is 
in no way committed to sharing this view by accepting the thesis put forward in this 
paper. The strongest claims that I wish to make in this paper are, firstly, that 
Heidegger’s later philosophy provides an ontology (understood here in the broadest 
possible sense) that is highly compatible with much ecofeminist philosophy. And 
secondly, that this ontology is one that ecofeminists should endorse because it offers 
them a means by which to extend and deepen their insights in ways that they should 
find acceptable. (I am indebted to Dr. Seiriol Morgan for his clarificatory comments 
regarding these points.) 
14 As stated earlier, I use the term “ecofeminism” in this paper to denote an anti-
dualist account of ecofeminism. The anti-dualist variety of ecofeminist philosophy 
includes both materialist and cultural forms of ecofeminism. In this I follow 
Carlassare’s argument that materialist and cultural forms of ecofeminism are not 
mutually exclusive. Rather “materialist strategies for social change are implicated in 
cultural ecofeminism, and cultural or idealist strategies for social change are 
implicated in socialist ecofeminism” (Carlassare 2000: 99). Coined by Ynestra King 
to describe Susan Griffin’s ecofeminist philosophy, anti-dualist ecofeminism is 
opposed to any oppressive dualistic dichotomies, e.g. reason/culture, passive/active 
and thus stands in opposition to any forms of ecofeminist essentialism, such as that of 
Mary Daly, in that they serve to reinforce such dualisms (King 1989: 28, Daly 1979). 
15 Heidegger states, “Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When 
we are seeking the essence of ‘tree’, we have to become aware that what pervades 
every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other 
trees” (Heidegger 1993: 311) 
16 Pattison 2000: 35-36, 65.  
Macquarrie and Robinson provide the following helpful definition, “Ontological 
inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with 
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entities and the facts about them” (Heidegger 1962:31). In other words, the ontic 
concerns the properties of existent things, whilst the ontological concerns what it is 
for the thing to be, or exist. 
17 To say that technology is outside of human control does not entail that technological 
development is autonomous. Rather it is meant to suggest that the essence of 
technology is beyond human mastery.  
18  Heidegger 1962: 56-57, 1993: 318. 
19  Pattison 2000: 50. 
20  Pattison 2000: 51-52. 
21  Heidegger 1993: 320-1. 
22 Mitcham 1994: 52. 
23  Pattison 2000: 54. 
24 Alderman comments, “A being thus technologically uncovered stands in a position 
to be disposed of in a productive process, and the beings of technology are nothing 
more than this passive stance of waiting to be used by man” (Alderman 1978: 47).  
25  Heidegger 1993: 323. 
26 Pattison 2000: 66. 
27  Heidegger 1993: 322. 
28  Heidegger 1993: 322. 
29  Heidegger 1993: 323. 
30 Heidegger here uses the word “man” to refer to human beings in general, although, 
as Garlick suggests, a more literal reading may be appropriate much of the time 
(Garlick 2003: 179). 
31  Heidegger 1993: 317. 
32  Heidegger 1993: 317. 
33  Heidegger 1993: 317. 
34 Young 2002: 41. 
35  Heidegger 1993: 126. 
36  Young 2002: 41. 
37 For more information on the relations between nature and spirituality in the later 
Heidegger see Swer: 2008. 
 
38 It has been pointed out by some commentators that the Ancient Greeks also 
wreaked considerable damage upon their environment, and thus that Heidegger’s 
account of their “gentleness” is somewhat idealistic (Ihde 1993: 112). However, as 
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Young observes, “it matters not at all to Heidegger’s essential purposes whether his 
‘Greeks’ are actual or fictional…” (Young 2002: 43). Rather, the example of the 
Greeks serves as a means of contrast, a counterpoint to the contemporary mode of 
technological existence against which its violent character becomes readily apparent. 
It also gives us a suggestion of what a non-technological mode of existence might 
resemble. Insofar as it fulfils this function, the historical veracity of Heidegger’s 
account of the Greeks is of secondary importance. (I must stress however that this 
does not mean that employing a Heideggerian-ecofeminist philosophy of the sort 
outlined in this paper commits one to the view that contemporary concerns regarding 
environmental devastation are of secondary importance.) 
39 Stambaugh translates Gestell as “framework”. Her analysis of the term is most 
revealing: 
“‘Gestell’ in the sense in which Hedeigger uses it does not belong to common 
language. In German, ‘Berg’ means a mountain, ‘Gebirge’ means a chain or group of 
mountains. In the same way ‘Gestell’ is the unity of all the activities in which the verb 
‘stellen’ figures: vor-stellen (represent, think), stellen (place, put, set), ent-stellen 
(disfigure), nach-stellen (to be after someone, pursue him stealthily), sicher-stellen (to 
make certain of something) (Heidegger 1969: 14). 
40  Heidegger 1993: 234. 
“Dasein” is Heidegger’s term for human being, “da” meaning “there” and “sein” 
meaning “being”. By using this term to refer to humans Heidegger draws our attention 
to what he takes to be Dasein’s essential nature, that it provides the “there” in which 
Being can be. Humans, for Heidegger, are ek-sistent beings, that is to say beings who 
“stand out” into the presencing of Being. Heidegger writes that, “man occurs 
essentially in such a way that he is the “there”, that is, the clearing of Being” 
(Heidegger 1993: 229). Within the Enframing, humanity forgets that its ordering of 
nature, as it manifests itself as pure resource, is ordained by Being itself rather than 
imposed on nature by the human will. It is not the ability to exercise the will that 
makes a person free, according to Heidegger. Humanity, of all the beings that exist 
upon the earth, have the ability to witness the presencing of Being, that is to say, the 
way in which a world holds forth. It is in this unique ability that humanity’s essential 
nature can be grasped. Heidegger states that, “that essential space of man’s essential 
being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself solely from out 
of the conjoining relation that is the way in which the safekeeping of Being itself is 
given to belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used by Being” 
(Heidegger 1977: 39). Humanity in no way determines when and how Being 
manifests itself as a horizon of disclosure. However Being cannot “world” without a 
human Dasein to provide the space in which it can do so. In this way Being both uses 
and needs humanity. Thus the essence of an epoch of Being and the essence of 
humanity are linked. A human’s “essence is to be the one who waits, the one who 
attends upon the coming to presence of Being in that in thinking he guards it” 
(Heidegger 1977: 42). Humanity, in essence, is the “shepherd of Being” (Heidegger 
1993: 234). 
41  Young 2000: 366. 
42  Huntington 2001: 33. 
43  Mies & Shiva 1993. 
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44 It should be noted once again that the term “ecofeminism” is used throughout this 
paper to refer to the anti-dualist variety of ecofeminism. 
45  Zimmerman 1990: 269. 
46 See Bernstein 1988. 
47 Dreyfus and Spinosa’s make a similar claim about the totalizing nature of epochs of 
Being. They argue, however, that this position stems from Heidegger’s “middle 
period” and that in his later philosophy he moved towards the view of a new era of 
Being ushering in “a plurality of local worlds” (Dreyfus & Spinosa 1997: 173).  
48  Salleh 1997: 144. 
49 That is to say, by maintaining existence and social life. 
50 Heidegger 1993: 320. 
One may feel that I am stretching Heidegger’s account of physis/Being beyond its 
original intention by linking it to women’s experience of childbirth. However, I argue 
that Heidegger is explicit in linking birth to Being. He states. “Birth and death take 
their essence from the realm of disclosiveness and concealment”, namely from the 
self-revealing flux of aletheia, the truth of Being (Heidegger 1998: 60). 
51  Young 2002: 41. 
52 It is of fundamental importance that one recognize that this is not an argument for 
essentialism. All humans, as Dasein, “essentially” have an ek-static nature. 
Reproduction is one way in which some women may become aware of their ek-static 
nature.  
53 A good example of this is provided by Shiva’s ecofeminist philosophy, which she 
defines as “Feminism as ecology, and ecology as the revival of Prakriti” (Shiva 1989: 
7). The concept of “Prakriti” is decidedly ontological in a Heideggerian sense. It is 
said to be, “the living force that supports life”, “a living and creative process”, “the 
source of all life” (Shiva 1989: xvii-7). 
54 Griffin, poetically, goes to the very heart of all this, saying 
“We dealt with hunger. We dealt with cold. We were the ones who held things 
together… We were the ones who, after working all day, made the meals… We made 
sure everybody ate… We were the ones who watched the wearing down and the daily 
mending and did what had to be done with the lost. We were the ones who knew what 
it all meant. Each breath. The cost. The years. We knew the limits…  And what had to 
be done. We knew the length of caring… We felt the children come to life in our 
bodies… Day after day we kept things going… We were the ones who held things 
together” (Griffin 1978: 188-189). 
Throughout this paper I take the view that Griffin’s philosophy is not essentialist in 
the sense of holding that there are biological connections between women and nature, 
as it is so often taken to be (for example, by Stabile, amongst others) (Stabile 1994). 
Rather I support Tong’s suggestion that Griffin is best understood as holding that 
there are ontological connections between women and nature (Tong 1998: 257). 
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55 Simon James draws out the significant but generally overlooked role of embodiment 
in the philosophy of the later Heidegger. Far from being a point of solely academic 
interest, James points out that overcoming dualistic, mind/body conceptions of human 
beings has important implications for overcoming the era of the Enframing. He asks, 
“If unsustainable practices are bodily as well as mental, might the comportment which 
could bring about sustainability be, to a certain extent, a bodily comportment, not just 
an exclusively mental understanding of the world, but a way of acting as an embodied 
being?” (James 2002: 4). 
56 The term “oblivion”, in Heidegger’s usage, means forgetfulness or disregard. It is 
the “failing-to-remember-that-conceals”. 
57 Heidegger 1962: 98. 
58 In “The question concerning technology” Heidegger states that, within the Gestell, 
“everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to 
stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering” (Heidegger 1993: 322). 
The parallels between this and Heidegger’s earlier descriptions of the equipmental 
totality of the work-world are obvious. 
59 Heidegger still appears to hold this view in his later account of the nature of 
scientific knowledge provided in “Modern science, metaphysics and mathematics.” 
Here he argues that science reduces all entities to objects (Heidegger 1993: 303). He 
later abandons this view of science in favour of the argument that science operates as 
the herald of technology, or in other words, that science is intrinsically technological. 
60 Heidegger 1962:88-9 italics in original. 
61 In this way his thinking during this pre-kehre period can clearly be seen to have an 
indelibly modernist tenor. 
62 I would argue that Heidegger, at this stage in his thought, intended these categories 
to apply only to non-human entities.  
63 Heidegger 1993: 323, my emphasis. 
64  Heidegger 1993: 323. 
65  Heidegger 1962: 100. 
Griffin evokes the violence that inevitably follows from this depiction of entities as 
human resources, 
“Separation. Tearing away. Breaking… the weed… from the flower, the metal from 
the mountain, uranium from the metal, plutonium from uranium, the electron from the 
atom, the atom splitting, energy from matter, the womb, spirit, from her body, from 
matter, cataclysm, splitting…” (Griffin 1978: 98). 
66 Pattison defines “destining” as follows, 
“‘Destining’ translates the German term Geschick, which has the twofold meaning of 
‘destiny’ and ‘suitability’ or ‘capacity’ – and Heidegger intends both of these 
meanings to be heard in his use of the word. ‘Destining’ is therefore not simply a 
destiny or fate imposed on the world from outside, but suggests a self-adaptation on 
the part of Being to the way the world is, making its self-giving and self-disclosure 
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suitable to the capacities of those who receive it. It is therefore a two-way process” 
(Pattison 2000: 3). 
67 Heidegger would doubtless find contemporary talk of transferable skills and flexible 
labour to be the culmination of the transformation of human labour into pure resource. 
No longer is one even a separate class within the technological work-world, e.g. a 
joiner, a typesetter, but a ubiquitous “worker”. 
68 Vandana Shiva makes this same point quite succinctly, stating that with the rise of 
patriarchy “man was separated from nature, and the creativity involved in processes of 
regeneration was denied. Creativity became the monopoly of men, who were 
considered to be engaged in “production”, while women were engaged in mere 
“reproduction” or “procreation” which, rather than being treated as renewable 
production, was looked on as non-production” (Shiva 1994: 128).  
69 The way in which this takes place will be explained further in the subsequent 
section. 
70  Heidegger 1993: 324. 
71 Salleh states that women in modernity, “like nature… are readily available and 
disposable; and like nature they have no subjectivity to speak of” (Salleh 1997: 94). 
72  Heidegger 1962: 102. 
73  Heidegger 1962: 103. 
74  Heidegger 1962: 104. 
75 This corresponds to a point Salleh makes about women within modernity being 
defined as deficient entities. She writes, 
“Eurocentric (i.e. modernist) cultures are arranged discursively around what has 
standing (A) and does not (notA). Such a logic gives value to A expressed by the 
value of 1. NotA is merely defined by relation to A, having no identity of its own, and 
thus 0 value.” Man, being “productive”, is 1. Woman, by contrast, is “only 0, a hole, a 
zero. She is thus defined negatively as a lack” (Salleh 1997: 35-36). 
76  Glazebrook 2001: 225. 
77  Glazebrook 2001: 228. 
78 Warren states that, “In a patriarchal conceptual framework, higher status is 
attributed to what is male-gender identified than to what is female-gender identified. 
This alleged higher status is then used to ‘justify’ the power-over power and privilege 
of men and the subordination of women” (Warren 1993: 17).  
79 Thus men can be connected to the feminine principle as well as women, and 
conversely women may, like men, remain within the Gestell, outside the feminine 
principle. 
80 Albeit understood by them as physis/Nature. As an example let us turn again to 
Shiva’s ecofeminist philosophy with its understanding of Nature as Prakriti: 
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“Nature as Prakriti is inherently active, a powerful, productive force in the dialectic of 
creation, renewal and sustenance of life… Prakriti is worshipped as Aditi, the 
primordial vastness, the inexhaustible, the source of abundance. She is worshipped as 
Adi Shakti, the primordial power. All the forms of nature and life in nature are the 
forms, the children, of the Mother of Nature who is nature itself born of the creative 
play of her thought… The will-to-become-many… is her creative impulse and through 
this impulse, she creates the diversity of living forms in nature. The common yet 
multiple life of mountains, trees, rivers, animals is an expression of the diversity 
Prakriti gives rise to. The creative force and the created world are not separate and 
distinct, nor is the created world uniform, static and fragmented. It is dynamic, diverse 
and inter-related… Prakriti lives in every stone or tree, pool, fruit or animal, and is 
identified with them (Shiva 1989: 38-39). 
The similarities between Shiva’s account of Prakriti/Nature and Heidegger’s account 
of Being and Physis should be obvious.   
81 On the suppression of Being/the feminine principle Shiva writes, 
“Activity, productivity, creativity which were associated with the feminine principle 
are expropriated as qualities of nature and women, and transformed into the exclusive 
properties of man. Nature and women are turned into passive objects, to be used and 
exploited for the uncontrolled and uncontrollable desires of alienated man” (Shiva 
1989: 6) However this division is by no means necessary. “Ontologically, there is no 
divide between man and nature, or between man and woman, because life in all its 
forms arises from the feminine principle” (Shiva 1989: 40). “The feminine principle is 
not exclusively embodied in women, but is the principle of activity and creativity in 
nature, women and men. One cannot really distinguish the masculine from the 
feminine, person from nature… Though distinct, they remain inseparable in dialectic 
unity, as two aspects of one being” (Shiva 1989: 52). In this way the recovery of the 
feminine principle has significance for both genders. It is a feminine, rather than a 
female principle, and thus includes men.  “The recovery of the feminine principle is a 
response to multiple dominations and deprivations not just of women, but also of 
nature and non-western cultures. It stands for ecological recovery and nature’s 
liberation, for women’s liberation and the liberation of men who, in dominating nature 
and women, have sacrificed their own human-ness… It is a recovery in nature, woman 
and man of creative forms of being and perceiving” (Shiva 1989: 53).  
82 We see here the influence of Spengler in Heidegger’s notion of distinctive world-
cultures, each with their own epochal characteristics. See, for instance, Spengler 2002: 
90-104. 
83 This brings to mind Hans Jonas’s point that technology radicalizes the will-to-will, 
in that it gives that elite the power to make the world into the way that they perceive 
it. 
84 The following analysis is adapted from Steve Garlick’s account of the role of the 
Gestell in establishing heterosexual norms and regularizing sexual activity (Garlick 
2003).  
85 Marcuse 1991. 
86  Garlick 2003: 162. 
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87  Garlick 2003: 162. 
88 Botha supports this point, saying that in the Enframing “human being is no longer 
Dasein as an open possibility, but rather a grounded actuality, a fixed identity” (Botha 
2003: 161). 
89  Garlick 2003: 166. 
90 Garlick 2003: 166. 
91 On this point Griffin states that, 
“the mind that invents a delusion of power over Nature in order to feel safe is afraid of 
fear itself. And the more this mind learns to rely on delusion, the less tolerance this 
mind has for any betrayal of that delusion… It has begun to identify not only its own 
survival, but its own existence with culture. The mind believes that it exists because 
what it thinks is true. Therefore to contradict delusion is to threaten the mind’s very 
existence. And the ideas, words, numbers, concepts have become more real to this 
mind than material reality” (Griffin 1989: 13). 
92 Heidegger states, “man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and 
postures as the lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that 
everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives 
rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always 
encounters only himself” (Heidegger 1993: 332). 
93 Heidegger 1993: 320. 
94  Wolin 2001: 119. 
95 Shiva 1991: 15. 
96  Shiva 1989: 121. 
97 Shiva states that, “the new biotechnologies are the latest tools for transforming what 
is simultaneously a ‘means of production’ and a ‘product’ into mere ‘raw material’” 
(Shiva 1994: 133). 
98  Shiva 1991: 21. 
99  Shiva 1989: 140. 
